CMD superman logo.jpg SourceWatch, a project of the Center for Media and Democracy,

depends on donations from people like you!

Click here to make a tax-deductable contribution.

Sick Building Syndrome

From SourceWatch
Jump to: navigation, search

This article is part of the Tobacco portal on Sourcewatch funded from 2006 - 2009 by the American Legacy Foundation.

The term "sick building syndrome" (SBS) is used to describe situations in which occupants of buildings experience acute illness and discomfort that appear to be linked to time spent in a building, but no specific illness or cause can be identified. Symptoms are said to include headache; eye, nose, or throat irritation; dry cough; dry or itchy skin; dizziness and nausea; difficulty in concentrating; fatigue, and sensitivity to odors. The exact cause of the symptoms is not discoverable, but sufferers report relief soon after leaving the building.[1]

Controversy

"Sick Building Syndrome" came to the attention of the public largely through the highly organized and funded efforts of the tobacco industry, who promoted the notion of "Sick Building Syndrome" to deflect attention from secondhand smoke as a point-source pollutant linked to health complaints and discomfort of occupants in offices and factories.

Tobacco companies maintained that secondhand smoke, also known as Environmental Tobacco Smoke or ETS, plays a minor role in "sick-building syndrome," and that instead ETS served merely as an indicator of larger problems present within the building. The industry, through paid surrogate third-party air quality companies like ACVA Atlantic and Healthy Buildings International, pointed to chemical agents, like radon and bioaerosols in the indoor environment, as the main causes associated with complaints of illness among workers. The industry used "Sick Building Syndrome" thus to deflect the focus on tobacco smoke as a primary indoor pollutant and to point out that any attempt to address the discomfort of building occupants by banning smoking was "misdirected and inadequate."[2]

Tobacco industry documents

  • A 1985 memo from Susan Stuntz (a Tobacco Institute Vice President) discusses presentations and testimony given by industry air quality consultant Gray Robertson at public hearings about ventilation. Robertson owned ACVA Atlantic, the environmental engineering firm the Tobacco Institute hired to analyze the air quality in buildings. Robertson testified at public hearings for smoking restrictions that the presence of tobacco smoke, rather being a problem in and of itself, was only an indicator of larger ventilation problems. A handwritten note on the memo states, "This really does help us broaden the issue beyond tobacco smoke."[3]
  • Reginald B. Simmons, an employee of Healthy Buildings International (HBI), an environmental consulting company used by the Tobacco Institute starting in 1986 to encourage businesses not to ban smoking but to look for other causes of air pollution, gave courtroom testimony in which he told how the industry applied the notion of "Sick Building Syndrome" to deflect attention from secondhand smoke. Gray Robertson, owner of HBI, frequently used the term "Sick Building Syndrome," and with the tobacco industry's assistance and funding, widely promoted this "syndrome" throughout the United States to deflect attention from tobacco smoke as a point source of indoor air pollution as cause of illness for people inhabiting buildings.

Reginald Simmons worked for HBI in 1986, when the company first started associating with the Tobacco Institute. He noted that HBI experienced a vast increase in workload after that time, hiring and training many more workers to inspect buildings all over the world. Simmons described the ground rules that were laid down for sampling air in all of the buildings inspected for the Tobacco Institute:

Mr. [Peter] Binnie [Vice President of HBI] had a number of instructions and ground rules for us to follow that applied to all of the buildings we inspected, private and public: (1) when taking air samples for nicotine tests, we were instructed to take air samples in lobbies and other easily accessible areas where the circulation was best, thus reducing the readings; (2) if asked, always recommend to clients that any air pollution problem could be solved by better ventilation; (3) banning or restricting tobacco use or smoking was never to be recommended; and, (4) every inspection report was to be reviewed and undergo final editing by either Mr. Binnie or Mr. Robertson before it was sent out.

Simmons stated that the results of his reports were altered after he submitted them to his superiors:

Q. Were your reports ever edited or changed after you submitted your reports to Mr. Binnie or Mr. Robertson?

A. It is my understanding that the reports were always edited by Mr. Binnie or Mr. Robertson.
Q. How do you know that your reports were changed after you submitted them to Mr. Binnie or Mr. Robertson?
A. On many occasions involving inspections of both public and private buildings, I would later see the inspection reports in the main files and note that Mr. Binnie or Mr. Robertson had changed the data and the conclusions. For example, when I had recommended a restriction or banning of smoking, Mr. Binnie would edit it out of the final inspection report. It was also a standard practice for Mr. Binnie to reduce the actual results of two significant tests that were done on buildings: (1) the test for airborne particle count ("APC"); and (2) the test for weighing airborne particles ("WAP")...
Q. Are the results of these tests important?
A. Yes. These two tests are critical for providing accurate information about airborne particles in the final inspection reports for buildings.
Q. To your knowledge, did clients ever learn that the results of these tests were reduced?

A. No. The clients, both public and private buildings owners and tenants, were never advised of the alteration of the data.

Simmons testified that the Tobacco Institute and its members sent HBI employees all over the world to perform building inspections, and that money was no object:

...we stayed in the most exclusive and expensive hotels and were told we could have anything and everything we needed. We were provided drivers that took us to each city and took care of all of our personal needs... On weekends, we were allowed to go anywhere we wanted at the expense of Philip Morris. For example, one weekend they took some of us, myself included, to the St. Moritz Resort where we all went skiing; other team members went to Venice and Florence, Italy, for the weekend ... I personally turned in, for my group's two weeks in Scandinavia, approximately $12,500 of expenses for hotels, meals, and miscellaneous purchases. Money was never an issue when working for the Tobacco Institute or its members ... [4]

Sourcewatch resources

External resources

Search the Documents Archives of the Tobacco Industry
Legacy Tobacco Documents Library:


References

  1. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Indoor Air Facts No. 4 (revised) Sick Building Syndrome, Indoor Air Quality. Accessed April 30, 2009
  2. Philip Morris ETS, Indoor Smoking and Indoor Air Quality: Planning for the 1990s Draft; report. April 22, 1992. Philip Morris Bates No. 2023371119-2023371157
  3. Stuntz S., Tobacco Institute. Ventilation Testimony Memorandum. July 5, 1985. Bates No. TIDN0013592. Esp. see note in marginalia.
  4. United States Department of Justice Testimony of Reginald B. Simmons Civil Action No. 99-CV-02496 (GK). Undated, but recorded in trial in 2004