Microvote MV-464

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The Microvote MV-464 is a Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) voting machine. This article generally describes the specific MV-464 model.

Main article: Voting machines

Design and operation

Voter verification

The MV-464 does NOT have a federally-qualified voter-verified paper audit trail capability.

Brief description

This model is no longer in production.

Detailed Voting Process

The voter makes each candidate selection by pressing the gray button beside a candidate’s name. This turns a light on next to the button. To change a selection, a voter presses the gray button a second time, and the light turns off.

The voter may navigate forward through ballot screens by pressing the green “Advance Ballot” bar at the bottom of the panel. The voter may navigate back through ballot screens by pressing the blue “Review Ballot” bar at the bottom of the panel. The voter must view all pages of the ballot before the machine will allow a vote to be case.

To cast a write-in vote, the voter presses the gray write-in selection button on the bottom left side of the panel. The light next to it will start blinking. The voter then writes in the desired name on the paper tape in the write-in window, also at the bottom left of the panel. The voter may change his or her mind by pressing the same write-in button again to turn out the light, and then vote as usual.

To cast the ballot, the voter presses the red “Cast Vote” button on the bottom right side of the panel.

Reported problems

Pre-2008 election

  • November 1995, January 1996: Pennsylvania - The DREs shut-down haphazardly, causing the current voter's vote to be lost. The scroll motors emitted power surges that caused the machines to go into power-fail mode and shut down to protect the circuitry. Accumulation software malfunctioned reported incorrect unofficial results.[1]
  • July 1998: North Carolina - The DREs shut-down haphazardly, causing the current voter's vote to be lost. The scroll motors emitted power surges that caused the machines to go into power-fail mode and shut down to protect the circuitry.[2]2
  • November 2003: Indiana – Electronic vote-tabulation equipment reported that 140,000 votes had been cast in a county of 50,000 residents.[3]

NASED Qualification Status

The National Association of State Election Directors NASED Qualification Status: No longer in production.

Articles and resources

Related SourceWatch articles

References

Note: This article was originally copied from the Electronic Frontier Foundation's fact sheet, "Electronic Voting Machine Information Sheet: Microvote MV-464", Version 1.1 of October 29, 2006. See more EFF articles on voting machines at http://w2.eff.org/Activism/E-voting/protection.php

External resources

“Security Analysis of the Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting Machine ,” Center for Information Technology Policy, Princeton University, September, 2006. See http://itpolicy.princeton.edu/voting/. Diebold’s response may be found at http://www.diebold.com/dieboldes/pdf/princetonstatement.pdf.

Tadayoshi Kohno, Adam Stubblefield, Aviel D. Rubin, and Dan S. Wallach, “Analysis of an Electronic Voting Machine”, IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2004. IEEE Computer Society Press, May 2004. See: http://avirubin.com/vote.pdf

“DRE Security Assessment, Volume 1, Computerized Voting Systems, Summary of Findings and Recommendations,” InfoSENTRY, 21 Nov. 2003. See: http://www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/hava/files/InfoSentry1.pdf

“Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) Technical Security Assessment Report,” Compuware Corporation, 21 Nov. 2003. See: http://www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/hava/files/compuware.pdf

“Risk Assessment Report: Diebold Accuvote-TS Voting System and Processes (redacted)”, Science Applications International Corporation SAIC-6099-2003-261, Sept. 2, 2003. See: http://www.dbm.maryland.gov/SBE

“Trusted Agent Report -- Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting System,” RABA Technologies, Jan. 20, 2004. See: http://www.raba.com/text/press/TA_Report_AccuVote.pdf


External articles