Boycotts against the tobacco industry
Who undertook action: White Citizens Council
Type: White supremacist organization
Size: Small
Years: 1956-1958
Scope: Regional, mainly U.S. south
Targeted companies: Philip Morris (PM)
Focus of action: Philip Morris cigarette
Concurrent events: PM received awards for supporting the African American community (hiring practices, scholarships, charitable contributions)
Industry behavior change sought: Stop supporting African American community
Smokers / smoking a focus? Yes, smokers urged to switch to other manufacturer
Main strategy: Boycott
Supporting strategies: Minimal press, almost exclusively in organization's newsletter
Well-funded? No
Breadth of campaign: Narrow, little support; Ku Klux Klan endorsed it
Evidence of effectiveness: Boycotters claimed PM suffered loss, but financial statements refute assertion
Industry response: White industry reps reached out to white community; a black rep reached out to black community;
Resolution: Boycott lost steam, petered out
Industry gains/losses: Decades later, PM used the fact that it was boycotted by racists to curry favor with African Americans when it was charged with targeting the community. At that time, PM claimed the boycott hurt the company financially, although it had earlier said there was no impact.
Community gains/losses: Insignificant during boycott, but potentially harmful to African Americans years later when PM used the fact of the boycott to ally itself with African Americans and market to them
Good for tobacco control? No, health was never an issue.
Observations: A boycott that does not address harms of tobacco unlikely to benefit tobacco control; as an invitation to negotiate, a boycott legitimizes the industry and often gives it a marketing advantage.
Links: The perimetric boycott: a tool for tobacco control advocacy
Who undertook action: Coalition of 18 national Jewish organizations
Type: Jewish community advocacy organizations
Size: Variable, represented majority of organized Jewish community
Years: 1956-61
Scope: National, USA
Targeted companies: Brown and Williamson (B&W), an affiliate of British American Tobacco (BAT)
Focus of action: All B&W cigarette brands
Concurrent events: In 1956, B&W parent BAT agreed to Arab demands not to sell certain brands of cigarettes in Israel
Industry behavior change sought: B&W / BAT resume cigarette sales to Israel
Smokers / smoking a focus? Yes
Main strategy: Boycott
Supporting strategies: Demonstrations, publicity
Well-funded? unknown
Breadth of campaign: Widespread Jewish community support; additional support from Italian-American organizations
Evidence of effectiveness: Internal documents revealed company was concerned and claimed a loss of sales
Industry response: Company developed a plan to settle the strike and woo the Jewish community
Resolution: B&W capitulated, resumed sales to Israel, advertised that fact in Jewish press while otherwise maintaining low profile to avoid offending Arab nations
Industry gains/losses: Industry big winner; used resolution of boycott as entree to Jewish market. Supported Jewish organizations, funded scholarships, recruited Jewish newspapers to promote Viceroy cigarette, negotiated with American Jewish Committee to have B&W president receive humanitarian award
Community gains/losses: Community flexed its muscle successfully to achieve its goal and became recipient of company's largesse, but was unmindful of the long-term health consequences of B&W cigarette sales in the Jewish community
Good for tobacco control? No, health was never an issue.
Observations: A boycott that does not address harms of tobacco unlikely to benefit tobacco control; as an invitation to negotiate, a boycott legitimizes the industry and often gives it a marketing advantage.
Links: The perimetric boycott: a tool for tobacco control advocacy
Who undertook action: Georgians Against Smoking Pollution (GASP); (Stop Teenage Addiction to Tobacco (STAT); Infact (Corporate Accountability International)
Type: Tobacco control / corporate responsibility organizations
Size: Small core groups, some with large mailing lists
Years: 1984-2003
Scope: Regional, national (USA) and international
Targeted companies: Philip Morris (PM), RJ Reynolds (RJR)
Focus of action: Food products of tobacco companies
Concurrent events: Industry was becoming increasingly unpopular, Joe Camel cartoon campaign riled advocates, industry CEO's told Congress they didn't believe nicotine was addictive
Industry behavior change sought: Stop marketing that appeals to young people; stop spreading tobacco addiction internationally; stop influence over and interference in public policy on issues of tobacco and health; stop deceiving people about the dangers of tobacco; and pay the high costs of health care associated with the tobacco epidemic
Smokers / smoking a focus? No, industry's food products were selected targets in order to engage general public
Main strategy: Boycott
Supporting strategies: Demonstrations, petitions, letter writing
Well-funded? Moderately
Breadth of campaign: Engaged religious and youth groups; obtained some celebrity endorsements; Infact claimed 200 groups participating at height of action
Evidence of effectiveness: Documents show industry very concerned about potential of boycott
Industry response: Surveillance of activists, downplaying / ignoring boycott
Resolution: Infact declared victory upon adoption of international treaty, the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), and ended boycott
Industry gains/losses: Industry resources expended to deal with boycott, but no significant financial impact
Community gains/losses: Public educated about extent of tobacco industry holdings and tactics; none of demands satisfied
Good for tobacco control? Unknown, too soon to tell whether industry will try to claim that Infact's declaration of victory meant that PM and RJR met demands for corporate responsibility
Observations: As an invitation to negotiate, a boycott can legitimize the industry; demands must be clear and measurable; tobacco industry itself not a promising target for health-focused boycott
Links: The perimetric boycott: a tool for tobacco control advocacy
Who undertook action: AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power (ACT-UP)
Type: Grass roots AIDS advocacy organization with multiple independent chapters
Size: dozens to hundreds of members
Years: 1990-1991
Scope: National, USA
Targeted companies: Philip Morris (PM) and affiliate Miller Beer
Focus of action: Marlboro cigarettes, Miller beer
Concurrent events: PM had made sizable contributions to Jesse Helms library and campaigns. AIDS epidemic raging, eclipsing every other health concern in the minds of some gay activists
Industry behavior change sought: End financial support for NC Senator Jesse Helms (outspoken foe of AIDS funding and LGBT rights); contribute to AIDS/LGBT causes
Smokers / smoking a focus? Boycott expanded to include Miller Beer (after initial focus on Marlboro alone) in order to engage nonsmokers in the action; no focus on danger of tobacco, smoking treated neutrally
Main strategy: Boycott
Supporting strategies: Demonstrations, press conferences, letters, petitions
Well-funded? Not well-funded, grass-roots action
Breadth of campaign: Largely confined to LGBT and AIDS activist communities; almost no support from tobacco control
Evidence of effectiveness: Some press coverage, mostly in gay press; industry willing to negotiate
Industry response: Strategic documents in PM’s files about how best to respond to boycott (downplay or ignore); editorial from PM executive in gay press touting PM’s support for AIDS services and branding ACT-UP as a fringe group; lawsuit against some organizers.
Resolution: Leaders of boycott negotiated with PM, who agreed to make large contributions to AIDS organizations, but refused to sever ties to Helms. Some boycotters felt betrayed.
Industry gains/losses: PM claimed boycott had little to no financial impact. PM used this action against it to cultivate LGBT market by building relationships with AIDS/LGBT groups, recruiting LGBT allies for the industry, advertising in the gay press for the first time, and improving its image as generous donor. Relatively minor expenditure of PM's resources to deal with boycott
Community gains/losses: Some AIDS organizations received sizable donations. There was almost no consideration of the long-term health consequences of tobacco in the LGBT community.
Good for tobacco control? No, industry used resolution of boycott to gain entree to new market; tobacco health hazards not an issue in the boycott
Observations: A boycott that does not address harms of tobacco unlikely to benefit tobacco control; as an invitation to negotiate, a boycott legitimizes the industry and often gives it a marketing advantage.
Links: From adversary to target market: the ACT-UP boycott of Philip Morris
Who undertook action: Coalition of Lavender-Americans on Smoking and Health (CLASH)
Type: LGBT tobacco control organization
Size: 8-10 people
Years: 2001-2003
Scope: San Francisco Bay Area, California, USA
Targeted companies: Brown & Williamson (B&W)
Focus of action: Gay and Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation (GLAAD), a national LGBT media watchdog membership organization, that for several years hosted Lucky Strike smoking lounges for B&W at annual GLAAD Media Awards banquets in NY, LA and SF.
Concurrent events: Growing awareness of tobacco threat within LGBT community
Industry behavior change sought: None
Smokers / smoking a focus? No
Main strategy: Threat of perimetric boycott (boycott of those on the perimeter of the industry, e.g., retailers or beneficiaries) At stake was the good will toward GLAAD that translated into financial support for the organization (memberships and donations)
Supporting strategies: Calling attention to GLAAD's role in supporting smoking; demonstrations, publicity, letter writing campaign; award-winning documentary made about smoking lounge
Well-funded? No, grass roots
Breadth of campaign: Activists involved supporters of GLAAD in lobbying organization for policy change
Evidence of effectiveness: Former U.S. Ambassador Jim Hormel criticized GLAAD for hosting smoking lounges from banquet podium; favorable articles in LGBT press
Industry response: This action bypassed the industry. No response was sought from industry and none was forthcoming.
Resolution: GLAAD ended smoking lounges in 2003
Industry gains/losses: B&W lost a venue for promoting smoking as well as the public relations benefit of associating with highly respected organization; industry further isolated
Community gains/losses: LGBT community won one more smokefree venue; GLAAD forfeited $15,000 annually from B&W; GLAAD held accountable by community
Good for tobacco control? Yes, marginalizing industry helps denormalize smoking; action sparked debate about issue in community
Observations: Organizations that depend on good will of the public for their funding may be persuaded to sever ties to tobacco industry.
Links: The perimetric boycott: a tool for tobacco control advocacy
